Worldview Politics

Review of the Iraq War
12 April 2008

General Petraeus, the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, just presented Congress with his review of the situation in that embattled country, and, not surprisingly, he sees evidence of progress and advises against withdrawal. Before giving you my opinion, let us see what various journalists have to say. This will enlighten us on the political situation in America, as well as on the tragic situation in Iraq. In wartime, spin is paramount.

Mark Benjamin on 'Sizing Up Petraeus'

A good place to begin is with Mark Benjamin's article Sizing Up Petraeus in Salon magazine. He compares Petraeus' testimony to Congress with the actual facts on the ground. Petraeus claims that the surge is working: 'We do see progress in the security arena.' As Benjamin notes, it is true that violent 'incidents' are down, but only to the high mid-2005 levels, in the case of the military, or to the February 2006 levels, in the case of civilians. A civil war still rages. Much of the decrease in violence is due to what must be called 'ethnic cleansing', whereby Sunnis and Shias have been segregated through violence. Mostly it's the victorious Shias who have largely cleaned Sunnis out of Baghdad. Petraeus euphemistically refers to this as 'sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods'. In no way does this indicate that a political reconciliation is on the horizon, and the situation could explode again, with or without the American presence. Moreover, the US military has been 'cutting deals' — i.e. bribing — Sunnis to fight Al Qaeda rather than Americans. That is working for the moment, since the Sunnis can pocket American money and weapons and rid themselves of the Al Qaeda nuisance, while waiting to fight the Americans another day. Another deal has been brokered with Muqtada al-Sadr, the 'radical' Shiite cleric, who has agreed to a temporary truce with the Americans, for pragmatic reasons similar to the Sunnis.

As stated, the real issue is whether there is any real national reconciliation taking place among Iraqi factions. Petraeus claims that such reconciliation is slowly manifesting. Indeed, there has been some minor progress on paper, such as allowing Baathists back into the government, but implementation has been uneven and uncertain. Besides, Iraq's parliament is sheltered in the Green Zone bubble and has little authority outside of it. The basic fact, as Nir Rosen will remind us in a moment, is that the Shias have won and control the oil. Why would they want to 'deal' with the Sunnis?

Petraeus is honest when admitting that gains are fragile and the whole situation could crumble at a moment's notice. Recent intra-Shiite fighting indicates that American casualties are down only momentarily, as Iraq's factions sort things out among themselves. Petraeus then suggests that Iraq has the 'potential to develop into a stable, secure, multiethnic, multisectarian democracy under the rule of law', but this is just optimistic talk that no informed person takes seriously. Of course, in the distant future anything could happen. Would it not be more realistic to partition Iraq along the present ethnically-cleansed fault lines? The Sunnis would be the big losers, without the oil, but they are a minority. Let us remember that Iraq's 'national army' and police force are dominated by Shiites, mostly loyal to al-Sadr, who represents the teeming, poor masses, and who, of all the current Iraqi leaders, most wants the Americans out of Iraq.

Then the conversation turns to Iran, which the US administration is painting as the source of most of Iraq's present troubles. Petraeus claims that the Iranians are arming 'special groups', i.e. rogue militias, who are creating chaos by fighting the central government. Benjamin avers that the influence of Iran in Iraq is 'one of the murkiest and most difficult parts of the picture to assess'. The actual evidence for such involvement has been 'unclear'. In a broader sense, the Shiite Iranians do have a natural influence with Iraq's now dominant Shiites. This influence is not necessarily bad; recently, the Iranians brokered a cease-fire between Prime Minister Maliki (a Shiite) and al-Sadr at Basra. The Iranians also have strong ties to the clerics of ISCI (previously SCIRI), the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, who were sheltered as exiles in Iran during the Saddam days. ISCI is under the leadership of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who is crucial to Maliki's shaky status as Prime Minister. Petraeus tried to portray the recent conflict between Maliki and al-Sadr in a positive light, as the central government cracking down on rebels, but the situation was at best a draw, with many government troops defecting. Better news is that 'Al Qaeda' in Iraq is definitely on the run, but its importance was always exaggerated by the US administration.

Nir Rosen Tells It Like It Is

For honest journalism regarding the Middle East, one should discard the largely worthless establishment press and turn to someone like Nir Rosen instead. Rosen is a freelance writer, a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security, and a former fellow at the New America Foundation. He speaks Arabic and has spent over 36 months in occupied Iraq. He has traveled widely throughout the Middle East and lives in Lebanon. To me, he is remarkable as a 'progressive' voice who somehow is respectable enough to appear in the mainstream media. For instance, though Jewish, he minces no words about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, yet the fearsome 'Israel Lobby' has not managed to keep him off of the Newshour and similar media outlets. I guess it helps to have those academic credentials!

Indeed, back in March, the Newshour had him engaged in a lively debate with super-neocon Fred Kagan on the situation in Iraq. Kagan starts out by claiming that the surge has been a military success, with a considerable decrease in the sectarian violence, not only in Baghdad but elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, there has been 'remarkable' political progress, with 'landmark' legislation and a new 'political fluidity', as Iraqis become less afraid for their sheer survival. Rosen counters that the surge is 'absolutely a failure'. The decrease in violence has been due to the ethnic cleansing that has resulted from years of turmoil. Iraq has been segregated into Sunni and Shiite areas, and there is no mood whatsoever for political reconciliation. The decrease in violence is also due to the 'freeze' imposed by al-Sadr on the Mahdi army, over which the Americans have no control, and which could end at any time. The Sunnis, for their part, realize that they have lost the civil war, and starting in 2006, they decided to recoup, eliminate the irritant of Al Qaeda, and plan for the next stage. The Sunnis see the main enemy as the Iranians, which really means the Shiites in general. A ceasefire with the Americans will allow the Sunnis to regroup, collect weapons and territory, and prepare to regain control of Iraq. Both sides are laying low, for their own reasons.

Kagan is 'astonished' that Rosen, who has spent so much time in Baghdad, would buy into the 'myth' that there are no mixed areas left in Iraq. For instance, there are Shia enclaves even in Western Baghdad, traditionally a Sunni area. Rosen says this is because the Shias have penetrated even into Western Baghdad, and their takeover of the capital continues. What is truly frightening, says Rosen, is that when the fighting resumes in full force, which it will, there will be nowhere for refugees to run to, since neighboring countries and even Iraqi provinces have closed their doors. Thus, there will be a slaughter. Jim Lehrer asks Rosen why he is so sure the sectarian fighting will resume. Rosen, who speaks Arabic, replies that the Sunni militiamen he has spoken to are quite clear that their aim is to retake Iraq. Kagan says it depends on whom you talk to, and he insists that reconciliation is occurring. Rosen, for his part, insists that if you talk to the Sunni militiamen by themselves, without American soldiers being present — surely the case with Kagan! — then they are outspoken about their aim. The present peace with the Americans is part of the plan, as it gives them territory and a foothold.

Then they discuss the American occupation. Kagan asserts that the US has won a newfound respect among many Iraqis as a 'mediator'. Rosen counters that the occupation, like any occupation, continues to be brutal and to generate resentment. Things may have improved since the days of Abu Ghraib, but any occupation is violent and resented. Innocent Iraqis are being bombed and killed every day, and some 24,000 Iraqis are in prison, without having been charged. Kagan insists that the American presence is not an occupation and is fully in accordance with 'international law'! If we leave, the situation will deteriorate. Rosen does not think the troops will be fully withdrawn by any of the candidates, who all speak of an American presence for years to come. Most Iraqis (aside from the Kurds) want a full American withdrawal, says Rosen. However, some Sunnis are worried that if the Americans leave, they may be slaughtered. It's a dilemma. The occupation is brutal, but so would be withdrawal. If the Americans stay, they are only postponing the inevitable, which is civil war. Meanwhile, the Mahdi army is growing impatient with the ceasefire, and the Sunnis feel they are getting nothing from the Shiite government. There is no happy ending. Kagan remains optimistic, because he is a neocon thinktank pinhead.

More recently, on April 1st, Rosen was interviewed by Amy Goodman on Democracy Now! Rosen again insists that it is an 'absolute lie' to believe that the surge — really an escalation — has 'brought peace' to Iraq, as claimed by many American politicians. Violence has subsided, due to the ethnic cleansing, to the Mahdi ceasefire, and to the Sunni wish to regroup on their territory and to eliminate Al Qaeda. This has worked for the Sunnis, as the Americans are now off of their backs. The Sunnis view all Shiites as basically 'Iranians', who must be vanquished. Meanwhile, the Mahdi ceasefire is merely tactical, as they realized that the Americans were coming after them, so they might as well 'lie low' and 'wait the Americans out'. Indeed, both sides know that the Americans will leave eventually, perhaps soon, depending on the election. So it is in the interests of both sides to lay low, regroup, and prepare for the inevitable civil war. There is no government in Iraq; talk of a central government is 'absurd'. There are only militias and warlords, and the Shiites are even divided among themselves, with Maliki's Dawa party and al-Hakim's ISCI Badr brigades fighting al-Sadr's Mahdi army. (Dawa and ISCI, I believe, represent the merchant class, which may explain why the Americans favor them, while al-Sadr and the Mahdi army represent the poor Shiites and thus the vast majority of Shiites.) Interestingly, and perhaps curiously, Rosen goes on to claim that the inter-Shiite clashes may signify the end of the civil war, in that no Shiite group is now strong enough to fight the Sunnis. Several times before, he had claimed that civil war was 'inevitable'. He even envisages the possibility that the Mahdi army may unite with some of the Sunnis to fight the pro-American Shiite militias, such as Badr or Dawa.

Rosen goes on to debunk the American notion that Iraqis join militias to earn money. They do so for ideological reasons, to fight the Americans or other Iraqis. He emphasizes Prime Minister Maliki's weakness and irrelevance, as well as that of the entire government holed up in the Green Zone. Also, the recent fighting in Basra shows what a 'joke' the national army and police are, since they are full of Mahdi men, who will defect when push comes to shove. Likewise, the other members of the national forces are loyal to ISCI's Badr Brigades or to Dawa. No one is loyal to the Iraqi state, which was always an artificial British construction held together by Saddam's ruthlessness. Moreover, without American support, the government forces at Basra would have been utterly routed.

In the next segment, we are treated to footage of Iraqis protesting the American occupation. It is simply impossible to be an occupying power without bombing and killing many innocents, a basic fact of life that Americans are reluctant to accept. Rosen dismisses the notion that the American soldiers are simply playing the role of 'beat cops' maintaining order. Every day they kill innocent Iraqi citizens, and the resentment grows. The US forces hold 24,000 prisoners without charges, which is 'actually a good thing', says Rosen, as they would be treated even worse by the Iraqi forces. US troops are constantly beating down doors, or blowing them up, invading the privacy of homes, dragging out family members, violating the Muslim sense of decency regarding women, and so forth. Any occupation, claims Rosen, is a 'systematic imposition of violence on an entire nation'.

Then they turn to the role of Iran in Iraq. Rosen asserts that this alleged influence has been greatly exaggerated, by both the Americans and the Sunnis. He has never seen any good evidence for a significant Iranian combat role. The do have a strong presence with their Shiite brothers, but if anything, this has been put to good use, with Tehran brokering the recent cease-fire between Maliki and al-Sadr. Ahmadinejad was warmly received by Maliki recently in Baghdad, much to the annoyance of the Americans. Iranian ties with ISCI are even stronger, as Iran sheltered the ISCI clerics during the Saddam persecution. Iran is quite happy that its 'proxies', namely ISCI and Dawa, are in the Iraqi government, so it definitely is not trying to overthrow the government. (Again, I speculate that Sadr is less close to the Iranian clerics, because they too represent the rich merchant classes, as do ISCI and Dawa.) The US actually supplies far more arms to the Shiite militias, at least those with which we are in alliance, than do the Iranians. The Sunnis throughout the Arab world accuse Shiites of being Iranian agents, says Rosen, and we tend to listen.

Finally, we get a clip of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton arguing that we have given the 'precious gift of freedom' to the Iraqis, and it is up to them to decide what to do with it, while we begin to withdraw. Rosen calls her 'utterly contemptible', since we are entirely responsible for the Iraqi predicament. He goes on to say that 'we know that the Republicans are despicable, since this is their war', but the Democrats are equally to blame for putting the onus on the Iraqis. We created a civil war in Iraq, a country which had never experienced a civil war, and we imposed a series of dictators. There is no Iraqi state, only a fragmented society run by warlords.

Iranian Influence in Iran

Like many others, Paul Craig Roberts sees hints of an upcoming war with Iran in the Petraeus testimony. With Al Qaeda being routed by the Sunnis, the focus has turned to the so-called 'special groups' allegedly backed by Iran, which, in Petraeus' view, 'pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq'. Never mind that nobody had even heard of these 'special groups' until, oh, a few days ago. According to the neocon propaganda, says Roberts, the special groups are 'breakaway elements' of Sadr's army, which makes little sense, given that Sadr has been the vociferous anti-American nationalist so far, and it is rather our friends in ISCI who are close to Iran. No doubt 'vociferous anti-American nationalist' is what really bothers us about Sadr. Might as well kill two birds with one stone by falsely linking Sadr with Iran, the other thorn in our side that dares to insist on its national rights, such as those we agreed to under the NPT treaty. Anyway, when has the US government ever shown a deep understanding of the realities on the ground in the Middle East? Maybe it doesn't matter. Maybe we just create our own reality as we go along. (But see my commentary on an article by Robert Dreyfuss below.)

Roberts calls all of this talk of Iranian interference a 'blatant lie', like the ones that got us into Iraq in the first place, and he provides two important points to bear in mind:

Fact #1: Sadr is not allied with Iran. He speaks with an Iraqi voice and has his militia under orders to stand down from conflict. The Badr militia is the Shi'ite militia that is allied with Iran. Why did the U.S. and its Iraqi puppet Maliki attack Sadr's militia and not the Badr militia or the breakaway elements of Sadr's militia that allegedly now operate as gangs?
Fact #2: The Shi'ite militias and the Sunni insurgents are armed with weapons available from the unsecured weapon stockpiles of Saddam Hussein's army. If Iran were arming Iraqis, the Iraqi insurgents and militias would have armor-piercing rocket-propelled grenades and surface-to-air missiles. These two weapons would neutralize the U.S. advantage by enabling Iraqis to destroy U.S. helicopter gunships, aircraft, and tanks. The Iraqis cannot mass their forces as they have no weapons against U.S. air power. To destroy U.S. tanks, Iraqis have to guess the roads U.S. vehicles will travel and bury bombs constructed from artillery shells. The inability to directly attack armor and to defend against air attack denies offensive capability to Iraqis. If the Iranians desired to arm Iraqis, they obviously would provide these two weapons that would change the course of the war.

Indeed, it was our Stingers in Afghanistan that enabled the Mujahedeen to defeat the Soviet helicopter gunships. Notice that even this New York Times article relaying official propaganda from Ambassador Crocker admits that he has offered 'no direct evidence' for Iranian interference. Nevertheless, Crocker hopes that Maliki has a 'clearer view' of Iran's malign influence since the Basra debacle, when the real problem was almost certainly that Shiites in the 'national army' simply didn't want to fight their brothers. By the way, this is the same Maliki who warmly welcomed Ahmadinejad a short while ago, but we expect him to suddenly repudiate his Shiite brothers in Iran. I guess we'll soon see who wears the pants in Iraq.

Even if Iran were helping fellow Shiites in Iran, what fair person could blame them? We invaded their neighbor Iraq on false pretexts, killed upwards of a million innocents, sent four million into the misery of exile, and have constantly threatened Iran. Reagan supported death squads in Nicaragua against an insignificant 'threat' in our 'backyard', while the Iranians face an actual invading superpower right next door. Somehow, we are 'liberators' and they are 'terrorists'. In the end, though, we'll probably end up forfeiting a slice of Iraq to Iran, as the price we must pay for the foolishness of our foreign policy. It seems as though Allah is manipulating the brains of our leaders. (And you thought it was the 'Jewish Lobby'!)

There are surely strong ties between Iranians and their fellow Shiites in Iraq. Regardless of whether this includes military assistance, we can use these ties to help the situation. What we have to do is to stop threatening Iran and to start talking respectfully and earnestly with her. Iran has plenty of reasons to fear and hate us, from the CIA overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953, leading to the tyrannical Shah, to our support for Saddam during the bloody Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s, to our constant threats during recent years regarding a nuclear program that they have rights to under the NPT — the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to which we are also signatories. Due to prodding from Israel, we simply suspect the Iranians of wanting a nuclear weapon, without having good evidence. Indeed, the recent NIE debunked the notion that they have a secret nuclear program. However, Israel doesn't even want them to have the capability to switch over to nuclear weapons, despite the 200-300 bombs that Israel already has. Basically, the US and Israel want Iran to accept a subordinate status, and it is no wonder that they refuse. Now, if we were to treat them as equals, and if we were to stop threatening them, then perhaps we could cooperate on stabilizing the situation in Iraq. The Iranians have helped us in the past against the Taliban, and they have made repeated overtures for friendlier relations, which we have spurned. Just recently, they helped broker a ceasefire between Maliki and Sadr at Basra. It is we who do not want peace with them, unless it is on our hegemonic terms.

My Own Views

After a bit of reflection, it seems to me that the whole idea of a bloody catastrophe in Iraq if we leave is a bit farfetched. The Shias and Sunnis have already been segregated, in effect 'ethnically cleansed', thanks to our catastrophic invasion and subsequent blundering. The Shias are the victorious majority and have the oil. The Sunnis are the losing minority and have no oil. Unless we arm only the Sunnis, it is difficult to see how they will retake Shia territory. It is one thing to be in control and have a secret police to crush dissent. Under such circumstances, a brutal minority can control a country. But the Sunnis have been routed, and they cannot regain control unless they are armed and the Shiites are not. On the other hand, why would the Shiites want any Sunni territory, since it has no oil? The Shiites are the winners, pure and simple. I suspect that if we left, the current stalemate would simply continue.

The Al Qaeda-in-Iraq threat was always greatly exaggerated, at least as far as American security is concerned. Those terrorists may have precipitated Iraqi sectarian fighting with their bombing of Shiite mosques, but the damage is done, and they are now being wiped out by the Sunnis. They are a minor threat in Iraq and no threat at all to us. That is why Bush and Petraeus have shifted the focus to Iran.

Perhaps some portion of Eastern Iraq will be swallowed up by Iran, as already mentioned, but that would be our fault and hardly a serious danger to our national security. An Iran 20% larger would be as dangerous to us as the present Iran, which is to say, not at all. Besides, Iran already has problems with disgruntled minorities. It is hardly about to embark on a hegemonic role in the Middle East, regardless of what paranoid Sunnis may think.

One question we never seem to ask is whether the Iraqis want us to leave. I have seen plenty of anecdotal evidence, including polls, that most of them do. Nir Rosen has said as much. However, our general policy is to ignore the people in other countries and to rely instead on those leaders who cooperate with us. These are often outright puppets, or, if they have some democratic legitimacy, it is precarious, so that they feel that they need our support. For instance, Maliki is a compromise, who has little real power. No wonder he feels the need to cooperate with us, at least some of the time. Without our support, he might have been blown away by now. Likewise, the Saudi royal family depends on us for its survival, as does Mubarak in Egypt, and many other autocratic leaders in the Middle East. The US government probably prefers it that way. Despite our rhetoric, we always seem to be fighting the true nationalists, such as Sadr in Iraq. We seem to prefer oily well-dressed tycoon types like Chalabi, who also betray us.

All this talk of a bloodbath if we leave masks the real question: Does the US want to stay in Iraq, no matter what happens? Why have we built 4 or 5 gigantic bases there? Why have we built an embassy larger than the Vatican? It looks very much as though the US simply wanted this permanent foothold in Iraq in the first place, for geostrategic reasons, and all of the propaganda that got us in there and that is keeping us there is just that, propaganda to sway a gullible public. The real purpose of it all is American Empire, and the Democrats are simply going along as usual with their charade of weakness. At least, it sure looks that way. That would explain much else, besides. For instance, if our real aim is to stay, then we would want to keep the country divided, according to the old British 'divide and conquer' strategy. It seems as though that is just what is happening. We even have Shiites fighting Shiites, now that the Sunnis are preoccupied with Al Qaeda and rebuilding their territorial base. I really wonder who is manipulating whom in the grand game of Middle Eastern politics. Sometimes, it seems as if we are the imbeciles, and other times it seems that we have a secret and exceedingly devious long term strategy. Or perhaps we just want power and influence any way we can get it, and after we have made a mess somewhere, we simply support whoever will cooperate with us at the moment. Since most nations are full of patriots, this guarantees McCain's beloved 100 years of war.

Basra vs. Tet

UPDATE (17 April 08): Conn Halliman compares Maliki's rout at Basra to the Tet offensive. It has exposed the 'surge' as 'irredeemably farcical', according to an Indian diplomat, despite Petraeus' optimistic picture to Congress. Much of the Iraqi army simply 'disintegrated', according to Iraqi reporters on the scene, along with the Dawa and Badr brigades. Victorious Mahdi fighters confiscated their abandoned vehicles and paraded joyously through the streets. The Americans tried to 'distance' themselves from the debacle by claiming that Maliki had not consulted with them, but this claim is 'ludicrous', since the Iraqi army relies so heavily on the US. Indeed, it was only US air power that prevented a complete defeat for Maliki.

The surge was supposed to achieve the same goal as Nixon's 'Vietnamization' policy, namely, to allow our allies to 'stand up' against our enemies. In this case, our 'allies' are the Dawa and ISCI parties of the weak central government, headed by Maliki and Hakim, respectively. Hallinan claims that 'virtually every independent observer saw the attack as an effort by Maliki and the Americans to take control of Basra's oil resources preliminary to turning them over to private oil conglomerates'. This reinforces my suspicion that Dawa and ISCI represent the business classes of Iraq, who are happy to cut a deal with the Americans and get rich being middlemen, much like the Saudi royal family. They do not care about using the oil wealth to benefit the teeming poor Shiite masses loyal to Sadr and his Mahdi army. Hallinan says that only the Mahdi army and the Basra dockworkers were standing in the way of the oil deals, and this is what Maliki was trying to suppress. Needless to say, 'privatization' of the oil (and everything else) is the true religion of the American ruling class (and not Christianity). The rich must benefit and never the poor.

The fundamental lesson of Tet, and by implication of Basra, is that wars are won by morale and dedication, not by weapons and body counts. We also supported a discredited elite in Vietnam, while the Viet Cong were far more popular with the Vietnamese masses, due both to their socialism and to their nationalism against the American invaders. Al Sadr and his Mahdi army are playing a similar role as the Viet Cong, and we are repeating the same mistakes.

Our Lack of Conscience

UPDATE (17 April 08): As I step back and try to review the Iraq war in a more philosophical vein, I am struck by one salient fact regarding the American psychology: our complete lack of either shame for our behavior or compassion for the Iraqis. We invaded a much weaker nation on false pretexts (really lies), and we have killed as many as a million innocents and displaced as many as 4 million refugees. Yet there is almost no shocked conscience to be found in our political discourse. Even the war opponents are primarily concerned with American dead, while the Iraqi dead are in effect dismissed as so many insects. Not even Obama dares to speak up on this point.

But even callousness is superseded by hypocrisy. Far from repenting for the disaster we have created, our leaders are pontificating about the 'responsible' thing to do now. This enables them to engage in a charade of taking the moral high ground. Talk about chutzpah! The underlying, self-serving, and self-righteous assumption of almost the entire American establishment is that we are basically a major force for good in the world. Therefore, even the misery we cause is all part of an honest and well-intentioned mistake, and of course, we must be key players in cleaning up our mess (always according to our self-interest).

Recently, two top New York Times reporters in Iraq, John Burns and Dexter Filkins, appeared on Charlie Rose to discuss Iraq. There were no admissions of culpability, despite Bill Moyers' brilliant documentary exposing the complete failure of the establishment press to challenge the administration prior to the invasion. Burns even reiterated his passionate conviction that the US is far and away a force for good in the world, with the implication that events in Iraq are regrettable but not something for which we should feel remorse. The shamelessness of all those associated with the establishment! But of course, conscience has nothing to do with it. If you are part of the establishment in the first place, then you decided long ago that your career is more important to you than anything else. And an essential requirement for a powerful career is maintaining access to the high and mighty, though most of the sycophants do this with few qualms. So the entire establishment has a vested interest in scratching each others backs, despite the disasters they have caused (much as our CEOs give themselves golden parachutes no matter how bad their performance). Indeed, we see Burns patting the back of his younger colleague. And no scolding to be heard from Charlie Rose! That's because he's part of the establishment too. Our foreign policy is conducted by a self-serving elite that, by definition, cannot fail.

Dreyfuss on 'Further Lessons from Basra'

UPDATE (19 April 08): Robert Dreyfuss is a journalist I have come to respect, after reading his book 'Devil's Game', on 'how the United States helped unleash fundamentalist Islam', as well as from reading his many online articles on the Middle East. He has just written an article for The Nation, on 'The Lessons of Basra', which provides some reliable information that corrects some details of what I said above.

He agrees that Muqtada al-Sadr is the 'big winner' after the battle of Basra, and the defeat is a crushing blow for both Maliki and Bush. Sadr faced down the government forces not only in Basra, but also in Baghdad, Kut, Amarah, Nasiriyah, and Diwaniya — the last four being capitals of key southern provinces. It seems the government in the Green Zone bubble is as powerless as they say after five years of 'building up' the Iraqi national army and police. Of course, Iraq is already full of battle-hardened men. The problem is troop loyalty, which the Americans can do nothing about. Dreyfuss is a bit more critical of Sadr than I was, calling him a 'rabble-rouser', whereas I dwelled on Sadr's alleged desire to share the oil with poor Shiites. But Dreyfuss does agree that the battle in Basra was about control of the oil, as well as about trying to hurt Sadr before an election where he seems by far the most popular candidate. In Basra, Sadr is 'the boss', according the Dreyfuss. 'There was nowhere the Mahdi either did not control or could not strike at will', according to an Iraqi reporter on the scene working for the New York Times.

Now Dreyfuss claims that Iran has been supporting all Shiites in Iraq, both with money and weapons, including Sadr and the Mahdi army, as well as the faction composed of Maliki and Dawa, and the faction composed of Hakim, ISCI and the Badr Brigades. Moreover, Sadr has spent much time in Iran recently. This contradicts my claim above, which is common on the web, that Sadr is too nationalistic to deal with the Iranians, who evidently wish to 'hedge their bets' with competing Shiite sects in Iraq. Dreyfuss also agrees with the administration that Iran has been building and arming the 'Special Groups' that I derided above. Well, if a left-oriented and scholarly journalist like Dreyfuss says so, it's probably true!

We must remember that politics in the Middle East always remain murky and fluid, and I doubt very much that Sadr is taking any orders from Tehran. Anyway, as I said, we cannot blame nationalistic Iraqis for taking aid where they can get it to repel invaders. We would do the same, but our establishment is too damned self-righteous to see this simple truth. The true extent of Iran's influence in Iraq is probably revealed by the truce negotiated at Basra by Iran, which was a humiliation for the US if not Maliki. Notice that the surge is powerless to stop Iranian influence, which happens right under its nose. The occupier is always at a disadvantage to stop infiltration and underground support on hostile territory. Planes and bombs are useless, and there are not nearly enough troops to search every vehicle.

Dreyfuss agrees on the motive for Maliki's attack at Basra. He wanted to crush Sadr and the Mahdi army prior to an expected 'massive win' at the polls in Basra and throughout the Shiite south, which would mean the end for the shaky Dawa-ISCI alliance in the Green Zone. Furthermore, Basra is where most of the oil is, which drives the Iraqi economy. (Much of the rest is in the semi-autonomous Kurdish zone.) For years, Basra has been under the control of Sadr and a 'Sadrist splinter party' called the Fadhila (Virtue) party, says Dreyfuss. Fadhila has had some clashes with Sadr in the past, but it stayed out of recent fighting and is 'no doubt' a 'bitter opponent' of the Dawa-ISCI alliance. Last year, Maliki tried and failed to oust the governor of Basra.

Bush and Petraeus may now be pointing to the 'Special Groups', but this is a secondary concern. The real problem, as pointed out by Dreyfuss, is that after five years of building up the 'national' Iraqi army, it crumbled at Basra, as it became clear that Shiites don't want to fight Shiites for the sake of a flimsy and chimerical national government. Moreover, it was not just the Iranian government, but more specifically the Quds Force, recently declared 'terrorist' by the American administration, that brokered the recent cease-fire in Basra.

It seems clear to me that the Shiites in Iraq have won, aided by their brothers in Iran. The Sunni minority cannot regain power unless they are somehow armed far in excess of the Shiites. Are we prepared to do that? Our only other hope, it seems to me, is to try to play a dastardly game of splitting Shiites while arming Sunnis, in order to create bloody civil war and weaken everybody. It may seem like we are doing that right now, but I doubt that we are smart enough to prevail in the long run. We should just get out, and let the Iraqis sort things out. What are we really worried about? That we will lose our bases? That a Sadr government won't be as friendly to American oil companies? That we just hate to lose?

The Situation in Iraq

Mark Benjamin: Sizing up Petraeus on Iraq